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Abstract
Background: Hepatitis B outbreaks in healthcare settings are still a serious public health concern
in high-income countries. To elucidate the most frequent infection pathways and clinical settings
involved, we performed a systematic review of hepatitis B virus outbreaks published between 1992
and 2007 within the EU and USA.
Methods: The research was performed using two different databases: the PubMed Database and
the Outbreak Database, the worldwide database for nosocomial outbreaks. Selection of papers
was carried out using the Quorom algorithm, and to avoid selection biases, the inclusion criteria
were established before the articles were identified.
Results: Overall, 30 papers were analyzed, reporting on 33 hepatitis B virus outbreaks that
involved 471 patients, with 16 fatal cases. Dialysis units accounted for 30.3% of outbreaks followed
by medical wards (21.2%), nursing homes (21.2%), surgery wards (15.2), and outpatient clinics
(12.1%). The transmission pathways were: multi-vial drugs (30.3%), non-disposable multi-patient
capillary blood sampling devices (27.2%), transvenous endomyocardial biopsy procedures (9.1%),
and multiple deficiencies in applying standard precautions (9.1%).
Conclusion: The analysis of transmission pathways showed that some breaches in infection
control measures, such as administration of drugs using multi-vial compounds and capillary blood
sampling, are the most frequent routes for patient-to-patient transmission of hepatitis B virus.
Moreover some outbreak reports underlined that heart-transplant recipients are at risk of
contracting hepatitis B virus infection during the transvenous endomyocardial biopsy procedure
through indirect contact with infected blood as a result of environmental contamination. To
prevent transmission, healthcare workers must adhere to standard precautions and follow
fundamental infection control principles, such as the use of sterile, single-use, disposable needles
and avoiding the use of multi-vial compounds in all healthcare settings including outpatient settings.
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Background
Despite a reduction of newly acquired hepatitis B virus
(HBV) infections since the introduction of vaccination in
early 1990s, HBV remains an important cause of liver disease
in developed countries. Moreover, the virus has long been
recognized as one of the most insidious viral agents within
healthcare settings (HCS), and in fact a number of HBV out-
breaks in HCS are reported yearly in the USA and EU.
In HCS, HBV is mainly a blood-borne infection transmit-
ted to susceptible patients either from an infected health-
care worker (HCW) (professional-to-patient
transmission) or from another infected patient (patient-
to-patient transmission) [1].
The professional-to-patient transmission has been widely
investigated and is currently well accepted to be generally
related to exposure-prone procedures performed by a
viremic HCW; comprehensive guidelines are available on
the matter [2,3]. On the other hand, no comprehensive
systematic reviews on HBV patient-to-patient transmis-
sion have been published, even though patient-to-patient
transmission of HBV is still a serious problem often
involving subjects suffering from other severe conditions.
To describe the most frequent pathways of patient-to-
patient transmission and clinical conditions associated
with the infection, and to make a comparison between
European and American outbreaks, we performed a sys-
tematic review of reports published in the EU and USA
between 1992 and 2007.
Methods
Search strategy
We searched the PubMed Database [4] and the Outbreak
Database, the worldwide database for nosocomial out-
breaks supported by the Charité – University Medicine
Berlin [5]. The search on the PubMed electronic database
was limited to studies published from 1 January 1992 to
31 December 2007, human subjects and English lan-
guage. The mesh-terms 'hepatitis B/transmission', 'hepati-
tis B virus', 'cross infection', 'disease outbreaks' and
'iatrogenic disease' were used to obtain the search string.
The search on the Outbreak Database was made using the
key word 'hepatitis B' according to the provider's instruc-
tions; reports published before 1 January 1992 or after 31
December 2007 and the ones already retrieved through
PubMed were manually excluded.
Selection criteria
Inclusion criteria were established before articles were
identified to avoid selection biases. Only outbreak inves-
tigation reports describing patient-to-patient transmission
of HBV in HCS in the USA and EU between 1992 and
2007 were included. We considered 'outbreak investiga-
tion reports' as only those papers reporting a description
of the population and setting, and the outline of the epi-
demiological investigation performed. We included only
cases of HBV infection that were HBsAg-positive, as mini-
mum criteria. HCW-to-patient transmission had to have
been ruled out either because the presence of an hepatitis
B surface antigen (HBsAg)-positive HCW was excluded, or
by identifying the patient index case through molecular
characterization of the epidemic cluster(s).
We decided to consider only the USA and EU because they
represent two homogeneous areas with high health stand-
ards and comparable sociodemographic indicators but
different healthcare systems (i.e.: public or a public-pri-
vate mix for the EU, mainly private for the USA). Further-
more, only papers published between 1992 and 2007
(including outbreaks that occurred between 1990 and
2004) were considered because this period is assumed to
be rather homogenous and highly significant with regard
to HBV epidemiology, standards of care, availability of
diagnostic technologies, and medical devices. We also
recorded the time between the end of the outbreak and
the publication of the selected papers, as a further control
for a possible bias due to publication delays.
The selection of papers was carried out with a Quorom-
based algorithm [6,7] (Figure 1) by two authors (SL and
VP), all titles, abstracts (if available) and full-text versions
were examined. To guarantee transparency throughout
the selection process, all excluded papers were ranked
according to five main exclusion criteria:
1. investigation performed outside the EU or USA
(reports from countries that joined the EU after 1990
were included only if the outbreak happened after that
year);
2. outbreaks in which HCWs were identified as the
source of infection;
3. outbreaks outside a HCS;
4. papers that were a partial report of outbreaks
already selected;
5. papers which did not fit our definition of 'outbreak
report' (e.g. reviews, editorials, etc).
Excluded papers were assigned only one label, however,
some papers were excluded for more than one criterion.
Finally, the lists of references of selected papers were
screened for additional data.
As required by the editorial policy the "Quorum checklist"
for systematic reviews is reported in additional file 1.BMC Medicine 2009, 7:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/15
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The Quorom-based algorithm used to carry out the selection of papers Figure 1
The Quorom-based algorithm used to carry out the selection of papers.BMC Medicine 2009, 7:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/15
Page 4 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
Data extraction
Data were extracted by two authors (SL and VP). They
were not blinded to the names of the authors, institutions,
journal of publication or study results. Information was
collected on the following: country where the outbreak
happened; publication date; date of onset of the outbreak
(i.e.: for in-patient settings the day of admission of the
index case, or the day of first referral for care of the index
case for outpatient settings); date of the end of the out-
break (i.e.: the onset of the last case); type of healthcare
facility; population size; population characteristics (i.e.:
the main clinical features of patients admitted to the
unit); total number of cases; number of deaths due to the
infection; number of non-susceptible patients (i.e.:
patients with markers of previous infection or vaccina-
tion, which was considered to be zero if authors did not
report any information); possible/probable risk factors
and transmission pathway.
With regard to laboratory methods, we considered as
molecular epidemiology techniques only the characteriza-
tion of infection cluster(s) through polymerase chain
reaction amplification of one or more selected region(s)
of the viral genome. Genotyping and other methods of
cluster characterization, including serological characteri-
zations, such as sub-typing, were considered standard epi-
demiology techniques.
Data analysis
Five parameters were considered in the study: total number
of cases; duration of the outbreak (i.e.: time in months
between the day of onset and day of end of the outbreak or
as reported by the authors); attack rate (AR) (i.e.: number
of cases/susceptible subjects); fatality rate (FR) (i.e.: deaths/
total of cases); time to publication (i.e.: time in months
between the day of end of outbreak and publication).
Variations of median values between different outbreaks
were analyzed in light of four different outbreak character-
istics:
1. location, i.e.: EU versus USA;
2. HCS, i.e.: dialysis units versus others;
3. transmission pathways, i.e.: use of multi-vial drugs,
capillary blood sampling (CBS), multiple deficiencies
in standard precautions (i.e.: circumstances in which
the authors found a number of inaccuracies in the
application of standard precautions but did not corre-
late the outbreak with one in particular); transvenous
endomyocardial biopsy (TEB), blood products, and
undefined (i.e.: cases in which the authors failed to
point out any evident inaccuracy in the application of
standard precautions);
4. patients' clinical condition, i.e.: neoplasm versus
others.
Moreover, we analyzed the use of molecular epidemiol-
ogy techniques throughout the period.
The analysis was carried out by comparing median values
using the outbreaks as the statistical units. The variance of
the medians of each of the five parameters was separately
tested for the four outbreak characteristics considered; P
values (significant if <0.05) were calculated with the
Mann-Whitney U test for outbreak characteristics with
two ranks, and with the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis
of variance for outbreak characteristics with more than
two ranks. The analysis was carried out by Epi-info 3.5.1.
Results
The PubMed search resulted in 93 papers, 23 of which
were judged to meet the inclusion criteria and were con-
sidered in this review; four additional papers were
retrieved from the references. In addition, consultation of
the Outbreak Database provided three more papers which
met the inclusion criteria. In this way, 30 papers were ana-
lyzed in total, amounting to 33 HBV outbreaks, involving
471 patients with 16 fatal cases (Figure 1).
The list of all outbreaks including main features and refer-
ences is reported in Additional file 2.
Dialysis units were involved in 10 out of 33 reported out-
breaks (30.3%), medical wards and nursing home services
in seven outbreaks (21.2%) each, surgery wards in five
(15.2%) and outpatient clinics in four (12.1%) (Table 1).
Hematology units were the most recurrent among medi-
cal wards, and heart-transplant units were the most fre-
quent among surgery wards with three outbreaks each
(hematology, see rows 4, 18, 28 in Additional file 2; heart-
transplant units, see rows 2, 13, 31 in Additional file 2).
The majority of the outbreaks originated among patients
already affected by one or more underlying conditions
causing some degree of immunodepression, such as end-
stage renal diseases (ten investigations, 30.3%), diabetes
(nine investigations, 27.3%), neoplasms (four investiga-
tions, 12.1%), heart transplantation (three investigations,
9.1%), and only seven outbreaks (21.2%) affected
patients with no reported immunodepression.
A specific transmission pathway was found in 27 out of 33
outbreaks (Table 1), no clear explanation was given in the
remaining six (18.2%). The most frequent transmission
pathways were: multi-vial drugs in ten reports (30.3%),
non-disposable multi-patient CBS devices in nine reports
(27.3%) and TEB in three reports (9.1%). Multiple defi-
ciencies in applying standard precautions were identifiedBMC Medicine 2009, 7:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/15
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in three reports (9.1%). Transmission of HBV through
contaminated blood products was reported twice (6.1%):
the first event was related to the infusion of autologous
hematopoietic stem cells extrinsically contaminated (see
row 4 in Additional file 2) and the other was linked with
heterologous fresh-frozen plasma from a donor with
occult HBV infection. (see row 12 in Additional file 2).
Overall, molecular epidemiologic techniques were used
in 15 out of 33 investigations (45.5%), although the pro-
portion of investigations using such technology steadily
increased over the studied period, from only 22.2%
between 1992 and 1996, 40.0% between 1997 and 2002
to 64.3% in the studies published between 2003 and
2007. Molecular technologies were used to confirm all
outbreaks through the determination of phylogenetic
identity between the virus strains infecting patients, but,
apart from one case (see row 4 in Additional file 2), no
environmental samples were investigated in this way.
Sixteen out of 33 outbreaks were from EU countries: four
from the UK, three from Italy, two from Germany, two from
Sweden and one each from Belgium, Spain, France, Den-
mark and the Netherlands; the remaining 17 outbreaks were
from the USA. No significant differences in the main epide-
miologic parameters, such as number of cases, AR, FR, and
outbreak duration, were found between EU and USA out-
breaks; of note, the median time to publication was 39.5
months for EU and 22 months for USA reports (P = 0.0068).
ARs were calculated in 29 outbreaks (no data were pro-
vided on the exposed population in four reports).
Although the ARs ranged widely between 0.66% and
70.00% (median 8.9%), the variance of median values,
according to the outbreak characteristics, was not statisti-
cally significant.
Sixteen deaths were reported in five out of the 33 out-
breaks. Two out of those five, accounting for 11 out of 16
deaths, occurred among patients with neoplasms, who
reported a significantly higher median FR (P = 0.0215).
The outbreak duration was estimated for each event and,
according to the wide range of clinical and epidemiologic
conditions reported, it broadly ranged between 1 and 145
months (median 6 months). When the different transmis-
sion pathways were considered, it was found that the
longest outbreak duration affected patients having under-
gone TEB (median 124 months; P = 0.0303); whereas
when studying the different HCS, it emerged that out-
breaks which occurred in dialysis units had the shortest
duration (median 3.5 months; P = 0.0248) (Table 2).
The total number of cases was given for all reports and
ranged between 1 and 86 (median 7). The highest number
of cases was found in the outbreaks associated with TEB
and with multiple deficiencies in standard precautions
(median 63 and 31, respectively; P = 0.0012); considering
the different HCS, the outbreaks that occurred in dialysis
units had the lowest number of cases (median four; P =
0.0240) (Table 2).
Discussion
HBV outbreaks occurring within HCS are still a serious
public health issue in high-income countries involving
mainly patients already affected by severe conditions,
such as chronic renal failure, diabetes, and cancer, or
patients who have undergone solid organ transplant.
Table 1: Summary of the most frequent transmission pathways and most frequent healthcare settings involved.
Transmission pathways
Healthcare 
setting
Multi-vials Capillary blood 
sampling
Multiple 
deficiencies in 
standard 
precautions
Transvenous 
biopsy
Blood products Undefined Total
Dialysis 5 - 1 - 1 3 10
Medicine 3 3 - - 1 - 7
Nursing home - 6 - - - 1 7
Surgery - - - 3 - 2 5
Outpatient clinics 2 - 2 - - - 4
Total 10 9 3 3 2 6 33BMC Medicine 2009, 7:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/15
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This review analyzed only published events and does not
draw a reliable picture of the actual burden of HBV out-
breaks within HCS. The true incidence of events, the over-
all numbers of cases and deaths are very difficult to
identify given the limitations due to publication biases,
possible under-reporting of events, and the sensitivity
limits of the systematic research. Moreover, since there
were no specific guidelines for reporting outbreak investi-
gations within HCS until 2007 [8], the reports had very
different formats in which relevant data (e.g. the true
number of exposed patients or the total number of non-
susceptible patients) were omitted in some cases.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this review highlights
several topical factors. Firstly, we found that dialysis units
accounted for the highest number of outbreaks (10 out of
33), and that such outbreaks were the ones with the short-
est duration and the fewest number of cases. These data
might be explained by the fact that, in both the USA and
most EU countries, dialysis units have widely improved
and mandatory protocols for serological surveillance of
blood-borne infections, such as HBV and hepatitis C virus
(HCV), which enabled healthcare providers to promptly
identify also asymptomatic cases; the consciousness of the
risk of HBV transmission might also explain the higher
Table 2: Details of outbreaks.
Outbreak 
characteristics
Number of 
outbreaks
Duration of 
outbreaks 
(months)
pC a s e s
(number)
p Fatality rate
(%)
p
Median value
(range)
Median value 
(range)
Median value 
(range)
Location EU 16 11 (1–145) 0.3849a 5 (1–86) 0.4815a 0
(0–100)
0.4705a
USA 17 5 (2–40) 9 (1–38) 0
(0–16.7)
Clinical condition Neoplasia 4 10 (3–25) 0.5059a 6 (2–11) 0.4391a 40.9
(0–100)
0.0215a
Other 29 5(1–145) 8 (1–86) 0
(0–40.0)
Transmission 
pathways
Multi-vials 10 3.5 (1–14) 6.5 (2–29) 0
(0–81.8)
Capillary blood 
sampling.
9 9 (2–16) 11 (3–27) 0
(0–40.0)
Standard† 3 24 (4–40) 31 (14–38) 0(-)
Transvenous 
biopsy
3 124 (54–145) 0.0303b 63 (20–86) 0.0012b 0(-) 0.6384b
Blood product 2 13.5 (2–25) 3 (1–5) 0(-)
Undefined 6 4.5 (2–17) 2.5 (1–6) 0
(0–100)
Setting Dialysis 10 3.5 (2–17) 4 (1–14) 0 (-)
Others 23 9 (1–145) 0.0248a 11 (1–86) 0.0240a 0
(0–100)
0.1165a
Total 33 6 (1–145) - 7 (1–86) - 0(0–100) -
aMann-Whitney U test.
bKruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks.
† Multiple deficiencies in standard precautions; standard precautions as defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [10].BMC Medicine 2009, 7:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/15
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frequency of reporting in dialysis units than in other set-
tings. We also found that the highest number of such out-
breaks was associated with the use of multi-vials, which is
not unexpected. HBV outbreaks within dialysis facilities
have long been recognized as a serious problem [9,10],
and the evidence that dialyzed patients have a higher prev-
alence of blood-borne infections (e.g. HBV and HCV) [11]
has sometimes been reported as an indirect proof of HBV
transmission during the dialysis process. However the
contamination of blood during dialysis is hardly imagina-
ble when disposable dialyzer circuits and machines with
electronic fail-safe systems are used. Consistent with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data,
the results of this review strengthen the idea that dialysis
itself is nowadays a rather safe procedure and that out-
breaks are largely due to 'substantial deficiencies in rec-
ommended infection control practice, such as the use of
multi-vial drugs, as well as failure to vaccinate hemodial-
ysis patients against hepatitis B' [12]. It is noteworthy that
the latest revision of the 'Guideline for Isolation Precau-
tions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in
Healthcare Settings' released by CDC in June 2007 [1] has
included specific recommendations against the use of
multi-vial compounds to deal expressly with outbreaks of
viral hepatitis.
Patients with diabetes were found to be involved in HBV
outbreaks as a consequence of the habit of performing
CBS using non-disposable multi-patient devices. CBS is a
rapid and cost-effective tool for glycemia control in dia-
betic individuals both at home and during hospital stays.
Non-disposable multi-patient CBS devices have fre-
quently been believed to be safe by virtue of the sterility of
their piercing compound (i.e. disposable lancets). Never-
theless transmission through the non-disposable compo-
nents cannot be ruled out and such devices should be
reserved only for personal use at home, and replaced by
safety lancets in HCS. In fact, due to its resistance to envi-
ronmental compounds [13], HBV can be transmitted
through this route better than other blood-borne patho-
gens, such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and
HCV, and the risk of spreading HBV through CBS has
been proposed since the early 1990s [14].
Heart-transplant recipients appeared also to be at
increased risk of HBV infection, related to TEB. TEB has
been accepted as an accurate method to evaluate the status
of cardiac transplant rejection, and heart-transplant recip-
ients usually undergo this procedure several times after
transplantation [15]. In the reports analyzed here, infec-
tions are believed to have happened because of the com-
mon, procedure-generated spread of blood droplets,
especially during purging of syringes and withdrawal of
the catheter. Those droplets might contaminate
unwrapped TEB material and the virus could be transmit-
ted to the next patient. It is noteworthy that the spreading
of blood-borne pathogens through the contamination of
the healthcare environment has been supported by previ-
ous studies which demonstrated the presence of HBV in
the apparently clean environment surrounding an HBsAg-
positive patient after a vascular procedure [16-20] or dial-
ysis [21], therefore, environmental contamination could
play a role in outbreaks with unclear transmission path-
ways, in HCS such as dialysis units.
Due to the complexity of different biological patterns of
HBV infection (e.g. occult hepatitis, HBsAg mutants and
anti-HBs to HBsAg reversion in immunodepressed sub-
jects), the risk of HBV transmission through unrecognized
contaminated blood components is higher than the risk
for other blood-borne pathogens such as HIV and HCV
[22,23]. Here, we found two events of HBV transmission
both involving an HBsAg-negative subject as index case.
In one outbreak five patients were infected after being trans-
fused with autologous hematopoietic stem cells contaminated
during the preservation procedure; it is to be underlined that
HBV serological markers (i.e. HBsAg and anti-HBc) were neg-
ative in all patients at the time of stem cell harvesting, however
the liquid nitrogen used for cryopreservation was found to be
contaminated by HBV DNA and human DNA as a result of the
rupture of one of the cryopreservation bags (see row 4 in Addi-
tional file 2). In the second event the infection was due to
transfusion of fresh frozen plasma from a donor with occult
hepatitis (see row 12 in Additional file 2).
Patients with neoplasms were found to have a higher FR,
which is consistent with the evidence that such patients
are more prone than others to die after the infection. In
fact chemotherapy is known to enhance HBV replication
and a number of cases of fulminant hepatitis have been
described as the results of the reactivation of chronic
infections or the reversing from anti-HBsAg to HBsAg-
positive status.
Although a wide range of AR was observed, we did not iden-
tify any significant difference in AR median values between
outbreaks according to the different characteristics of out-
breaks considered. The lack of data on the infectivity of the
index cases did not allow any inference about this issue.
No outbreaks associated with endoscopic procedures were
found, and this is consistent with literature data. The
absence of endoscopic transmission of HBV has been
described in 12 reports studying 394 patients exposed to
endoscopies that had recently been used on HBsAg-posi-
tive patients; none developed clinical hepatitis and 357
(91%) had serologic confirmation that they had not con-
tracted HBV infection [24].
Moreover, two recent systematic reviews describing 140
[25] and 70 [26] endoscopic-related healthcare-associatedBMC Medicine 2009, 7:15 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/15
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infections between 1974 and 2004, respectively, under-
line that exogenous endoscopy-related infections are rare
events and generally restricted to bacterial agents. Never-
theless these reviews reported three cases of HBV trans-
mission [27-29] that were not included in our review (two
which occurred before 1992 and one of uncertain rele-
vance). However, even if there is no definitive evidence of
acute HBV infection as a consequence of endoscopy, con-
tamination with HBV DNA in gastrointestinal endoscope
channels has been reported [30-32], therefore, reprocess-
ing procedures of all endoscopic devices should always be
carefully applied.
Overall no differences have been found between the EU
and US reports, which indicate that no discrepancies exist
with regard to the characteristics and management of the
outbreaks in the USA and EU. It is noteworthy that since
the beginning of the analysis, a rather evident disparity
has been found between USA and EU papers, regarding
the time between the end of the outbreak and publication.
This significant difference might be due to the easier and
faster publishing system in the USA, where outbreak
reports are preliminarily published in the CDC weekly
bulletin (i.e. MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report), indexed since 1981, and eventually in peer-
reviewed journals. Indeed, 12 out of 17 US outbreaks were
published in MMWR.
In contrast, all but one (UK; see row 17 in Additional file 2)
of EU reports have been published only in peer-reviewed
journals. However, since March 2007, the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control has also been publish-
ing its official weekly bulletin (Eurosurveillance) and
whether the availability of this new tool could impact on
filling this gap will be evaluated in the near future.
Conclusion
We have found that several breaches in infection control
measures, related to some routine clinical practices
thought to be risk-free (e.g. point of care blood glucose
monitoring or preparation and administration of com-
mon parenteral drugs with multi-vial compounds) could
result in patient-to-patient transmission of HBV within
HCS. To prevent transmission of blood-borne pathogens,
HCWs must adhere to standard precautions and follow
fundamental infection-control principles, such as the use
of sterile, single-use, disposable needles, and avoid the
use of multi-vial compounds in all HCS including outpa-
tient settings. These principles and practices need to be
made explicit in institutional policies and reinforced
through in-service education for all personnel involved in
direct patient care.
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